Operation BULBASKET 6 June - 24July 1944

1.   Introduction and overview

2.   Insertion into France

3.   Attack on fuel trains in Châtellerault railway sidings 

4.   Minelaying Forêt du Défant

5.   Moving Campsites

6.   Verrières - attack in the woods 

7.   Execution of Bulbasket men at St Sauvant

8.   Reprisal air raid on Bonneuill-Matours 

9.   Carrying on 

10. Order to cease operations, replacement by 3 (French) SAS

11. Extraction

12. Aftermath

13. Graves and Memorials

14. SAS War Crimes Investigation Team

15. Timeline and Achievements

16. Roll of Honour

17. Picture Gallery - Graves of the Op. BULBASKET Soldiers

1. INTRODUCTION and OVERVIEW

Both attackers and defenders knew that the one of the key factors in the success of the invasion of Normandy would be the speed with which the Germans could reinforce Rommel's defences in northern France, particularly with the famed 'Panzer Divisions' of Tiger and Panther tanks. 

Operation BULBASKET was deployed to  block the Paris - Bordeaux railway to prevent or delay the German Army reinforcing the Normandy defences, particularly to delay the German 2nd SS Panzer Division 'Das Reich' from moving north, by railway (fastest method and easiest supply lines option) or by road (longer transit time, more fuel and supply line dependent). 

2. INSERTION

'A' Troop of B Squadron 1st Special Air Service Regiment (A Tp B Sqn 1 SAS) under Captain John Tonkin was parachuted in, commencing on 6th June 1944. Further groups were parachuted in on 8th, 10th and 11th June, with a further drop on 17th June which included RAMC medic Cpl Allan, and the 'trademark' SAS Vickers K-armed Jeeps. This was the first operational airdrop of Jeeps in militry history, using four large parachutes per 'frame', each frame holding one jeep. 

3. RAF MOSQUITO ATTACK ON CHÂTELLERAULT RAILWAY SIDINGS

The Operation's early major success was confirming intelligence received on 10th June 1944 of the location of the petrol supply train of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, in railway sidings at Châtellerault. Captain Tonkin explained that "a very frightened and therefore very courageous French civilian" (McCue. 1996:28), thought to be a railway worker, arrived at the SAS base and reported that there were 11 petrol trains in railway sidings about 1000 metres southwest of Châtellerault. As Lt Twm Stephens was a small, dark-haired Welshman with "a dapper moustache", and one of the better French-speakers in the troop, he was deemed most likely to pass off as a Frenchman and so was kitted out with a suit and other civilian clothes. With the railway worker and an enthusiastic Resistance fighter, Lt Stephens conducted a recce of some 120 kms by bicycle to confirm the intelligence but reported that the target was too well defended for B Squadron to attack it, therefore the information was passed back for the RAF to destroy the target by precision bombing.

No 140 Wing RAF, at RAF Gravesend, was immediately tasked to provide 6 aircraft for an immediate low-level attack mission, and simultaneously No 138 Wing, RAF Lasham, was tasked to provide a further 6 aircraft for a second attack shortly afterwards. These wings were undoubtedly selected as they had become experts in low-level precision bombing raids; in particular,  No 140 Wing had conducted the famous raid on Amiens precision in which hundreds of Resistance fighters, all under imminent sentence of death, were freed when Mosquitos bombed and breached the prison walls enabling the prisoners to escape. No 138 Wing RAF provided aircraft from No 107 Sqn RAF, and No 140 Wing provided 3 aircraft each from 464 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force and 487 Squadron Royal New Zealand Air Force.

The aircraft were the very potent Mosquito Mark FB Mark (Mk) VI fighter bombers, each capable of carrying 4 x 250lb bombs and armed with 4 x .303" Browning machine guns and 4 x 20mm Hispano cannon mounted in the nose of the aircraft. The Mosquito was a remarkable aircraft, known as 'the Wooden Wonder' as it was built of wood, and  designed 'on spec' by the de Havilland company, not for an extant Air Ministry requirement / specification. It was faster than any German fighter at the time, and initial variants were unarmed, relying on superior speed to escape from the enemy. In this aspect de Havillands were continuing the ethos employed in WW1 with the DH4 bomber, which was also faster than the contemporary German fighters.

Several variants of the Mosquito were developed, including night fighters, bombers, maritime strike aircraft, photo-reconnaissance aircraft, and of course the famous fighter bomber variants. such as the FB Mk VI used at Châtellerault. 

That night, 11th June 1944, the Mosquito Mark FB VIs attacked and destroyed the trains in the railway sidings. 

THE OPERATIONS RECORD BOOK (SUMMARY OF EVENTS) for No 107 Sqn at RAF Lasham records the following for 11 June 1944:

No. 138 Wing Airfield,

Lasham, Hants. 

11/6/44. WEATHER: -                     Warm front during the day - improving later at night. 

              OPERATIONAL FLYING.     The following aircraft and crews carried out a low level 

attack deep into France in the late evening. The target was 7 PETROL AND OIL TRAINS in the 

MARSHALLING YARDS AT CHÂTTELLERAULT:-

A/C Details

Note: Pilot of NT316, W/O Martin was Canadian, and pilot of NS886, F/Sgt Ross, was Australian. 

              OPERATIONAL FLYING.     When the aircraft reached the target area it was already dark, 

but the target was well alight as a result of the good work of another Mosquito attack

delivered earlier. All the aircraft bombed and the fires were considerably increased.

When the last of the six aircraft left, the Wing Commander delivered a cannon attack along

the whole length of the Marshalling Yards. Immense oil fires were left burning. 

All the aircraft returned safely to base by 00.30 hours, having been airborne for 3 hrs. 20 minutes. 

The Squadron's Operations Record Book (Detail of Work Carried Out) records the following narrative. 

PETROLEUM TANKERS IN MARSHALLING YARDS

AT CHÂTELLERAULT

---------------------------------------------------------

In resonse to a sudden call from the Army, W/CDR POLLARD led a formation of six aircraft in an attack on a large concentration of petroleum wagons in the Marshalling Yards at CHÂTELLERAULT.

Weather over England and France was cloudy and the formation was obliged to fly at 6000' above 10/10ths cloud for a considerable time.

The cloud began to break when the aircraft had penetrated 80 miles in to France and so the formation descended to ground level for the remainder of the journey.

On approachingthe target area the a/c climbed to 3000'.

Dusk was gathering as a dive attack was carried out. 

The a/c bombed at intervals of about one minute under direction from W/CDR. POLLARD.

Large fires were started by the fire of cannon as well as by the bomb bursts.

The a/c proceeded to BASE independently. 

No oposition was encoutered anywhere on route. All a/c reached BASE safely although J - JCG developed

trouble in the port motor.

S/LDR. BRITTAIN made a successful landing, having feathered the port airscrew. 

4. Minelaying Forêt du Défant

5. MOVING CAMPSITES (HARBOUR AREAS)

Standard operating procedure was to move campsites (known in more modern parlance as 'harbour areas' routinely to avoid the likelihood of the location becoming known and compromised, or perhaps even betrayed. 

As Paul McCue explains;

"Of even greater concern to Tonkin was the ever-present danger of discovery by the enemy. He was always aware of the dangers of remaining too long in one place, where informers or German radio detection-finding might pinpoint the camp." (McCue. 2006:62)

However suitable locations were not necessarily that easy to find.

Usually, as with Operation BULBASKET, harbour areas were in densely-wooded areas. Ideally locations with rugged terrain would be favoured as it made it more difficult for enemy vehicles to move through them undetected to attack the SAS unit. This reduced the enemy's ability to deploy quickly with heavy weapons. Such locations had to;

• be close enough to the unit's area of operations to reduce the chance of being compromised during long moves to carry out attacks;
• be reasonably accessible but not obvious, with reliable access and. egress routes, with plenty of emergency 'bug out' routes;
• have natural defensive positions;
• be close enough to, but also sufficiently isolated from, local civilian dwellings;
• have an adequate supply of fresh water;
• be camouflaged from the air;
• have capacity to hide caches of equipment and ammunition;
• have cover for vehicles e.g. the SAS's heavily-armed Jeeps.  

Drop zones for resupply drops had to be far enough from defended sites eg airfields, garrisons, factories, headquarters and so on, to ensure adequate separation from concentrations of enemy anti-aircraft artillery (flak) on the run-in and escape routes.

6. ATTACK ON VERRIÈRES CAMP

On the night of 3/4 July 1944, the SAS camp was attacked by the German Army; different theories pertain as to how the Germans became aware of the location of the SAS harbour area (camp). Two SAS NCOs, Sergeant Eccles and Corporal Bateman had been captured on the night of 28^th June in the process of conducting a sabotage operation. The two NCOs were interrogated, but resisted giving information for at last 48 hours to give their colleagues time to enact the standard protocol and relocate the SAS camp;  however finding a camp with an adequate water supply for the party proved very difficult, so when the Germans appeared not have extracted the knowledge of the camp from their comrades, the SAS detachment returned to Verrieres temporarily on 2 July, while a better site was sought.

Another theory is that local collaborators had discovered its whereabouts and passed the information to the German SS Security Police.

A force of several hundred German troops centred around the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Goetz von Berlichingen" attacked the SAS camp, at dawn on 3rd July. Trooper John Fielding, formerly member of a Norwich Auxiliary Units patrol, had been concerned about a Frenchman who had approached the camp, who was supposedly a Maquisard from another Resistance group. Although Trooper FIelding was highly suspicious, the Frenchman's identity was confirmed and he was released before the attack. But John Fielding always regretted not having shot him. Had the Frenchman been conducting a recce to confirm the presence of the SAS detachment in the camp? The Germans attacked and although they fought back, the SAS men realised that they were heavily outnumbered and needed to break out. Captain Tonkin stayed behind and set 'time pencil' explosives in the abandoned supplies before trying to escape. These explosives detonated later and are believed to have killed a number of German troops. 

A party of SAS men, French Maquisards and an American pilot, led by Lt Tomos Stephens, attempted to break out but were ambushed on a forest track in the Foret du Verrieres. Lt Stephens was wounded and subsequently beaten to death with a rifle butt by a German Officer; the 7 Maquisards were summarily executed. (Other accounts, including that of author Paul McCue, suggests that Lt Stephens may have been wounded in the head during the ambush, but also might have been shot with the 7 Maquisards. Another account relates that Lt Stephens was tied to a tree in front of the locals when he began to berate the Germans, and was then beaten to death.)

The uncaptured survivors of the SAS detachment regrouped at their pre-arranged rendevous point and continued with their mission until being ordered home.

7. EXECUTION OF THE BULBASKET MEN AT SAINT SAUVANT 

The remaining men, and US Army Air Force P51 pilot 2nd Lt Lincoln Delmar Bundy, were taken prisoner and taken to the same prison in Poitiers as Sgt Bateman and Cpl Eccles. On 7th July, they were all taken to the woods near St. Sauvant, and executed by firing squad commanded by Oberleutnant Vogt, who had been in command of the bicycle-mounted reconnaissance squadron who carried out the raid in the Foret du Verrières, under Hitler's infamous 'Kommando Befehl', which was illegal under the accepted international laws of armed conflict.

It appears that the SAS men were resigned to their fate, but tried to persuade the Germans that both Cpl Allan as a medic, and 2nd Lt Bundy as an airman, were not subject to the 'Kommando Befehl' and should not be executed, but to no avail. Unfortunately Bundy was wearing civilian clothes during his processing by the French Resistance down the aircrew escape route south to Spain, and was adjudged to have joined the SAS operation as a combatant and therefore as coming under the terms of the Kommando Befehl, as a commando or paratroop saboteur operating behind the lines, and both 2Lt Bundy and Cpl Allan were executed with the SAS soldiers.Their bodies were then buried in three graves dug the day before by Vogt's troops. Almost certainly, the Germans were also very keen to ensure that no witnesses remained to report hte murders. 

8. REPRISAL RAID on the CHÂTEAU de MARIEVILLE at BONNEUILL- MATOURS 14 July 1944

In conjunction with the survivors of B Sqn 1SAS, the Operation JEDBURGH team 'Hugh' which was conducting operations to the East of the Op BULBASKET area of Ops, reported these events back to Special Forces HQ in England. They identified the barracks at the Château de Marieville at Bonneuil-Matours as the HQ of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division that had murdered the SAS soldiers, and requested that a reprisal attack be mounted against the HQ.

SAS Brigade HQ liaised with No 2 Group (2 Gp) RAF, of the RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force, and Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Basil Embry, Air Officer Commanding  2 Gp, ordered 140 Wing RAF, which particpated in the raid on the railway sidings at Châtellerault,  to conduct the raid. On 14 July 1944 he personally briefed the 14 aircrews from 464 Sqn RAAF, 487 Sqn RNZAF and 21 Sqn RAF at RAF Thorney Island, where 140 Wing had moved shortly after the successful raid on the fuel tanker train in the Châtellerault railway sidings. 464 and 487 Sqns had taken part in the raid at Chatellerault. AVM Embry  particularly briefed the crews to 'let the bastards burn', but if shot down, to never mention the aspect of reprisal lest it provoked the Germans into tit-for-tat reprisals with the immortal words:

"if you get shot down and taken prisoner, don't shoot your mouth off about retaliation. You can't out-piss a skunk!'

(McCue. 1996:162)

AVM Embry earned the greatest respect and admiration of his aircrews, as although he was an AVM, he continued flying on operations to evaluate the capabilities, strengths and weaknesses of the aircraft his aircrews were using; he usually flew under the nom de guerre "Wing Commander Smith" in case he was shot down and captured, and usually flew as a wingman in the formation. However his frank and honest reports to the Air Ministry won him few friends in the Ministry. Embry was the driving force behind 2 Gp being equipped with the Mosquito FB VI, and under his command No 2 Gp had become one of the most accurate and efficient units within the whole allied air forces. 

The raid on Château de Marieville was in four phases;

• four Mosquitos would drop high explosive bombs;
• six Mosquitos would drop US AN-M76 Napalm-filled incendiary bombs;
• the remaining four Mosquitos would drop more HE bombs;
• finally the aircraft would return to strafe the target before returning to base.

487 Sqn RNZAF's Operations Record Book records that:

"a welcome change of tactics took place when 6 of our aircraft (including G/C. P.G. WYKEHAM BARNES) together with 8 others from 21 and 464 Squadrons took off in daylight to attack Gestapo Headquarters at BONNEUILL MATOURS". 

The Mosquitos left Thorney Island at about 21:00 hours UK Local time, and rendezvoused with an escort of 12 Mustang MK III long-range fighter escort aircraft for the very hazardous low level evening 'daylight' crossing of enemy-held territory in Northern France. The force reached the target at approximately 21:00 local time, when the German troops were eating their evening meal. The attack went as planned and all seven barrack blocks were destroyed; local estimates of the number of German troops killed varied from 80 to 200. All aircraft safely returned to Thorney Island in the early hours of 15 July. A further attack followed on the German HQ at Poitiers, using intelligence supplied by the men of A Tp B Sqn 1SAS.

Four aircraft from 464 Sqn RAAF participated in the raid, incorrectly described as "a special target  - Gestapo sleeping quarters was attacked at BONNEUILL-MATOURS', piloted by W/Cdr Panitz OC 464 Sqn - who earlier in the day had received his DFC from HM The King at Hartford Bridge - and S/Ldr Hyem, F/Lt Parsons and F/O Walton. 464's ORB lists the aircraft and crews as:

The Squadron's ORB records that "the majority of the bombs fell in the targert area - buidlings seen enveloped in flames and believed target well hit.' The ORB also reported that W/Cdr Panitz and S/Ldr Hyem both attacked trains on the flight back to base, both reporting good strikes on the targets. 

487 Sqn's ORB also records that "the attack was a success, the buildings being heavily hit and left in flames. All the aircraft returned safely."

The ORB for 21 Sqn RAF records the following details:

A/C Details

"Part of an attacking force of 14 aircraft detailed to attack Gestapo sleeping quarters, Bonnsuil Mateurs (sic).

Majority of bombs in target area with stray bombs seen to overshoot towards village and one or two on E. bank of river.

Buildings seen enveloped in flames and target believed well hit."

9. Carrying on 

10. Order to cease operations , replacement by 3 (French) SAS

11. Extraction

12. AFTERMATH

After the area had been liberated, normal life resumed. In mid-December, during the first 'la chasse' (the hunt) of wild boar on the land of Monsieur Fossembas in the Forêt de Saint-Sauvant, hunters discovered areas of disturbed earth and broken branches along the Borne Vezètre track. Subsequent examination of the site revealed the decaying human remains of several bodies so the local police were duly informed. On 18th December the site was excavated and several bodies of soldiers wearing British uniforms were discovered. In one grave of five soldiers, a label inside the battledress blouse of one of the men confirmed that the bodies were almost certainly those of allied soldiers. (The other possibility had been that the bodies were from an earlier pitched battle in the forest between the Germans and a local Maquis unit, but the battledress uniforms discounted that possibility).

The Germans had attempted to conceal the identities of the men by removing their identity tags, but two bodies were discovered with their tags intact thus confirming their identity as members of the SAS team but the label in a battledress blouse marked with the owner's name provided further confirmation, and a body in civilian clothes was confirmed to be that of 2nd Lt Bundy USAAF. 

In fact, three graves were excavated; the first contained 11 bodies, which all had battledress blouse uniforms. The second grave contained a further 9 bodies, all wearing battledress, but one wearing a pullover with a zip fastener, with his battledress blouse laying alongside his body. The third grave contained a further 11 bodies, 7 laying on their right sides with the remaining four being placed on top of their comarades, 10 of whom were wearing battledress uniform. The 11th body was wearing 'drill trousers', a leather waistcoat and laced shoes; this was almost certainly 2Lt Bundy. 

A Doctor Maupetit visited the wood on 20th December to conduct autopsies on the 31 bodies. 15 German prisoners of war were detailed to carry out the grim task of physically exhuming the bodies. Dr Maupetit autopsied 10 of the bodies, returning next day to complete the work on the remaining 21 men. The autopsy reports revealed that the Germans had conducted the executions with ruthless efficiency, detailing two riflemen to each prisoner. Some witnesses also reported hearing two rounds of cannon fire and bursts of machine gun fire. (It may be that the volley of rifle fire resembled the sound of a machine gun through the trees and at some distance.) 

On the evening of 21st December, the coffins were taken to Rom where they were tended by men from the FFI. The 31 bodies were buried in Rom village cemetery, with full military honours. The three men from the hospital were never located but are commemorated by a plaque next to the graves of their SAS comrades in Rom cemetery. 

Lt Tomos Stephens' body was found by locals on 3rd/4th July 1944 and was interred in the vault of two local families, the Mangier and De Montjon families, in Verrières Communal Cemetery. 

A number of German officers were tried for this War Crime after extensive investigations, and were convicted in 1947, but were all released by 1952. The officer who insisted Hitler’s order be carried out by the local forces was never even tried.

13. GRAVES AND MEMORIALS (see photographs section)

Verrières Communal Cemetery. Lt Tomos Mansell Stephens is buried in the family crypt / vault of the Mangier and de Montjon families.

Forêt de Verrières. Memorial to the SAS Troops and the French Resistance fighters at La Couarde. Includes marker stones where the bodies were found. Also there are memorial markers at the entrance to the track leading into the woods where the campsite was set up, and a marker close by the actual campsite location. (The actual campsite location is on private land). 

Rom Communal Cemetery. The graves of the 30 SAS troops of A Tp, B Sqn 1 SAS and 2nd Lt LD Bundy USAAF are in the civil cemetery at Rom.

Forêt de Saint Sauvant. There is a memorial stone with the names of the SAS troops inscribed on it. There are also markers in the woods where the 3 mass graves were found.  See images below.

14. SAS WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATION UNIT

15. ACHIEVEMENTS AND TIMELINE OF OP BULBASKET

In an analysis of the achievements of Operation Bulbasket, the author Paul McCue lists the following:

1. The initiation of four air attacks and a possible fifth, killing upwards of 150 German troops and an unknown number of Milice. Responsibility for the destruction of crucial petrol stocks, delaying the progress of the 2nd Panzer Division towards the Normandy landing area
2. The delay of the 226th Infantry Division from Bayonne.
3. The delay of the 227th Infantry Division from  Carcassonne.
4. Execution of 23 successful road and rail sabotage operations

Operation Bulbasket: Timeline

• 1 June 1944; Two officers of 'B' Squadron, 1st Special Air Service, Captain John Tonkin (OC) and Second Lieutenant Richard Crisp (2IC), were briefed on the operation by SHAEF in London
• 6 June; Their drop zone was an area of the Brenne marsh 19 miles (31 km) south west of Châteauroux, which they reached at 01:37 hours
• 7 June; further group from 'B' Squadron were parachuted in
• 9/10 June; move to 'Sazas' farm south of Montmorillon
• 11 June; further group from 'B' Squadron were parachuted in
• 10/11 June; location of petrol train confirmed. Tonkin contacted England and requested an air attack. A force of 12 de Havilland Mosquito fighter-bombers of No. 464 Sqn. RAAF, No. 487 Sqn. RNZAF, and No. 107 Sqn. RAF attacked the trains in the railway sidings. The mission was a success, destroying the fuel reserves for the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich.
• 12/13 June; Lieutenant Crisp, one of those later executed, was in command of a patrol that laid mines on the N147 in the Forêt du Défant, just before the 2nd SS Panzer Division arrived in the area.
• 13 June; move to Nerignac
• 19 June; move to Pouillac
• 21 June; move to Persac
• 25 June 1944; The SAS Squadron move to Verrières.
• 1 July; move to a new camp just south in the Bois des Cartes. Water supply failed. 
• 2 July; return to Verrieres. The force in the forest camp consisted of 40 SAS men, a P-51 Mustang pilot, Second Lieutenant Lincoln Bundy and nine men from the French Resistance.
• 3/4 July: German attack on Verrieres
• 5 July; survivors move to Foret de Plessac
• 6/7 July; men executed at St Sauvant
• 9 July; move to Charroux
• 14 July; move to Asnieres sur Blour or Forêt de Défant
• Subsequently, near Luchapt, Tonkin and the remainder of the Squadron (altogether eight survivors of the attack and three others), regrouped and carried on with the mission
• 24 July 1944; order to cease operations was received
• 28 July; move to north of Montmorillon
• 6/7 August; survivors extracted

16. ROLL OF HONOUR - OPERATION BULBASKET

FRENCH RESISTANCE FIGHTERS

SUMMARILY EXECUTED 3^RD JULY 1944. AFTER BEING CAPTURED IN VERRIÈRES FOREST. 

Rest in peace brave warriors. 

The curious story of 5727819 Trooper George Sydney Herbert Biffin A Tp, B Sqn, 1 SAS, who came back to life, click on the button below:

References

1. McCue, P. (1996) SAS Operation Bulbasket. Behind the Lines in Occuied France 1944.  Barnsley: Pen and Sword. 
2. McCue, P. (2006) SAS Operation Bulbasket. Behind the Lines in Occuied France 1944.  Barnsley: Pen and Sword. 
3.